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ERNEST L. FOLK, III*
1. Judicial Decisions
In contrast to last year's important Administrative Law
decisions,1 this area gave rise to no important rulings by the
Supreme Court of South Carolina during the survey period.
Stanley v. Gary,2 properly applied the well-settled rule re-
quiring exhaustion of administrative remedies. A demand
was made that a court oust a high school principal from his
position because of his discipline, actual and threatened, of
certain students who had, in effect, conducted a group boy-
cott against drinking a certain brand of milk served in the
high school cafeteria. The trial court's granting of a de-
murrer to the action was unanimously sustained on appeal,
on the ground that the relevant statutes3 afforded adequate
administrative remedies which the plaintiffs in this action
had ignored. Necessarily, school discipline rests initially in
the hands of the school's own administrative personnel, by
delegation, as the Court found, from the statutory authority
of a school district's board of trustees to "suspend or dismiss
pupils when the best interests of the schools make it neces-
sary."14 Any such action is reviewable by the county board of
education "which shall try the matter de novo,"5 and its de-
cision in turn is subject to "trial by the Circuit Judge de
novo with or without reference to a master or special ref-
'Associate Professor of Law, University of South Carolina Law School.
1. Folk, Administrative Law, 1960 Survey S. C. Law, 13 S. C. L. Q. 31
(1960) for comment on these decisions. Several important decisions handed
down after the date of the survey period will be discussed in detail in
next year's issue,
2. 237 S. C. 237, 116 S. E. 2d 843 (1960).
3. CODE oF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA §§ 21-103, 21-230, and 21-247 to
247.7 (1952).
4. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 21-230 (1952). "The general
powers granted to school trustees by Section 21-230 ... clearly permit the
trustees to delegate to the principal and superintendent of a school the
authority to suspend or dismiss pupils when the best interests of the
schools make it necessary." Stanley v. Gary, 237 S. C. 237, 245, 116 S. E.
2d 843, 847. Alternatively, the Court noted the "inherent power" of a
principal or superintendent to "suspend a pupil in a proper case" unless
the principal's delegated power has been revoked. Ibid.
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eree," with normal rights of appellate review thereafter.
Thus, as the Court ruled, relying on the numerous prior de-
cisions interpreting and applying the exhaustion rule, the
plaintiffs should pursue their administrative remedies "in the
interest of orderly procedure"7 before turning to the courts.
This reasoning is especially compelling where, as here, un-
usually ample review rights-in the form of two de novo
hearings-are available. There is nothing in the opinion to
suggest that any of the grounds justifying the suspension
of the exhaustion rule should be available here.8
The Workmen's Compensation cases produced the usual
spate of dicta regarding the scope of judicial review of awards
of the Industrial Commission. On the Commission level, the
claimant must establish the facts entitling him to an award
by a "preponderance of the evidence." However, once the
award is made, it will be judicially upheld, if there is "any
competent evidence in the record" to support the findings.10
The occasional language variations from the proposition, e.g.,
whether there is "evidence to sustain" the award" or "any
evidence reasonably tending to support the conclusions of
the Commission,"' 2 seem not to reflect any different concept
of the scope of review. Stated negatively, the award cannot
be based on "surmise, conjecture, or speculation"' 3 or merely
upon the "resolution of doubts,"'14 all of which seemingly come
to the same thing. The Court made clear that if there is a
conflict of evidence before the Commission, either of dif-
ferent witnesses or of the same witness, the Commission fact
6. CODE Or LAws or SOUTH CAROLINA § 21-247.5 (1952).
7. Stanley v. Gary, 237 S. C. 237, 246, 116 S. E. 2d 843, 847.
8. Some of the exceptions are discussed in Folk, Administrative Law,
1960 Survey S. C. Law, 13 S. C. L. Q. 31-34 (1960).
9. Cross v. Concrete Materials, 236 S. C. 440, 446, 114 S. E. 2d 828,
831 (1960).
10. Fowler v. Abbott Motor Co., 236 S. C. 226, 229, 113 S. E. 2d 737,
739 (1960) ; Cross v. Concrete Materials, 236 S. C. 440, 448, 114 S. E. 2d
828, 832 (1960) ; Steed v. Mount Pleasant Seafood Co., 236 S. C. 253, 256,
113 S. E. 2d 827, 828 (1960); Glover v. Columbia Hosp. of Richland Coun-
ty, 236 S. C. 410, 415, 114 S. E. 2d 565, 567 (1960).
11. Halpern v. De Jay Stores, Inc., 236 S. C. 587, 592, 115 S. E. 2d 297,
300 (1960).
12. Corley v. S. C. Tax Comm., 237 S. C. 439, 441, 117 S. E. 2d 577,
578 (1960).
13. Glover v. Columbia Hosp. of Richland County, 236 S. C. 410, 414,
114 S. E. 2d 565, 567 (1960); Fowler v. Abbott Motor Co., 236 S. C. 226,
229, 113 S. E. 2d 737, 739 (1960).
14. Cross v. Concrete Materials, 236 S. C. 440, 446, 114 S. E. 2d 828, 831
(1960).
2
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findings are "conclusive.""' This merely recognizes the truism
that the trier of facts-whether agency or court or jury-is
in a better position to deduce the truth from hearing and
seeing the witnesses than the appellate court from what is
preserved in the written record.
Cross v. Concrete Materials, is of interest because of its
clarification of the vague canon of "liberal construction" so
often said to apply to regulatory statutes administered by
agencies. This rule means that a given law, in this case the
Workmen's Compensation law, "will be construed liberally in
order to effect its beneficient purpose."'1 But the-standards
of proof before the administrative body, and the scope of
review of the evidence on review of the Commission's de-
cision, are not to be distorted or overriden in pursuit of a
"liberal construction." The Court's approach thus rejects
the view that "any doubt as to whether evidence sustains
the award must be resolved in favor of the determination of
the Commission" and leaves intact the rule of "any com-
petent evidence in the record.""'
2. Legislation
The administrative process received attention at the Gen-
eral Assembly's 1961 Session, which enacted two important
new regulatory statutes-the Uniform Securities Act,19 ad-
ministered by the Securities Commission (The Secretary of
State who is ex officio the Commissioner), and the Dairy
Commission Law,20 administered by a ten member Dairy Com-
mission. The most striking feature of the Uniform Securities
Act,"' from an administrative standpoint, is the broad dis-
cretion vested in the Securities Commissioner as administra-
tor of the statute. Of course, this is essential if the statute
is to protect the public from securities frauds; this is an area
in which the ability to take fast action outweighs the possible
disadvantage to the issuer seeking to float a security pub-
licly. Thus, in the registration of securities by two of the
three prescribed methods the Commissioner may require "ad-
15. Steed v. Mount Pleasant Seafood Co., 236 S. C. 253, 256, 113 S. E.
2d 827, 828 (1960); Glover v. Columbia Hosp. of Richland County, 236
S. C. 410, 418, 114 S. E. 2d 565, 569 (1960).
16. 236 S. C. 440, 114 S. E. 2d 828 (1960).
17. Id. at 446, 114 S. E. 2d at 831.
18. Id. at 448, 114 S. E. 2d at 832.
19. Act No. 159 of 1961.
20. Act No. 319 of 1961.
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ditional information" besides that called for by the statute.22
In all cases, he may authorize the omission of "any item of
information or documents from any registration statement.12
The broadest grant of administrative power relates to issuing,
on nine separate grounds, "stop orders," the effect of which
is to bar the sale within the State of the security which is
the subject of the order.24 This includes the entry of a sum-
mary order on notice but with opportunity for hearing post-
poned.25 There are powers of similar scope as to registration
of broker-dealers and others who do business in the securities
field.26 Much of the statute depends for its effectiveness upon
the rules and regulations to be issued by the Commissioner,
and Section 412 of the Act sets forth general requirements
for rule-making, as well as for other types of administra-
tive action by the Commissioner.
The Dairy Commission Act27 established a new adminis-
trative agency with state-wide jurisdiction and the usual
panoply of administrative powers to enforce the substantive
requirements of the bill-a stable price structure in the dairy
industry to be achieved by agency licensing of milk distribu-
tors, fixing of minimum prices, and prohibition of various un-
fair trade practices in the industry.28 The Commission's chief
disciplinary weapon is its power to suspend and revoke li-
censes of distributors and subdistributors, 29 and to take simi-
lar action against permits to bring milk into the state from
out of state.30 The Commission has broad authority to fashion
rules and regulations "necessary to make the provisions of
this act effective and to insure the proper enforcement there-
of."3' Any "order or act of the commission" is judicially re-
viewable at the instance of "any person . . . aggrieved"
thereby.32 However, review is broader than customary, since
22. Securities may be registered (1) by notification under Section 302
(a simple method for qualifying seasoned issues), (2) by coordination
with SEC registration under Section 303, and (3) by qualification under
Section 304 (full registration of the security with the Commissioner).
Additional information may be required for registration by notification,
Section 302 (b) (7), and by qualification, Section 304 (b) (17).
23. Act No. 159 of 1961, § 305 (e).
24. Id. at § 306.
25. Id. at § 306 (b).
26. See generally §§ 201-204, Act No. 159 of 1961.
27. Act No. 319 of 1961.
28. Ibid.
29. Id. at § 5.
30. Id. at §§ 9, 10, and 12.
31. Id. at § 14(A).
32. Id. at § 14(A) (3).
1961]
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it is granted not only on the administrative record but also
"on such additional evidence as the parties offer, subject to
the rules of evidence as enforced in other legal proceedings."33
The Commission is also empowered to require licensees to
maintain records which are available for Commission inspec-
tion, as are the premises where products are processed, stored,
etc. 34
The Commission has the usual powers to subpoena wit-
nesses and documents.3 5 The ambiguous wording of the stat-
ute seemingly suggests that on refusal, the Commission need
only apply to a court for an order by which the recalcitrant
person "may be punished for contempt of court." 36 If this is
so, the Commission has the advantage of an abbreviated pro-
cedure for subpoena enforcement. Usually, the agency (a)
issues its subpoena, and upon disobedience to the subpoena
(b) requests a court to enforce the subpoena; but (c) even
if granted the agency may have to go back to the court for
a contempt citation if the witness still refuses to comply. In
this lengthy procedure, there are two judicial rulings, viz.,
enforcement order and contempt citation, each subject to ap-
pellate court review. If the dairy commission's power is in-
terpreted as the statute literally reads, the second step in the
subpoena-enforcing procedure is eliminated, and the agency
may go directly from disobedience to its order to a contempt
citation in the court.37 Needless to say, on the application
for a contempt citation, the court is empowered to review the
subpoena on the usual grounds-reasonableness, oppressive-
ness, etc.-as no court is called upon to rubber-stamp an
agency subpoena. There is much to be said for this shortened
procedure, since delay in enforcing subpoenas stymies the
agency at an initial phase of its investigation. This delay
is particularly, perhaps dangerously, unfortunate in the case
of a product as perishable as milk.
A bill38 was also introduced in the Senate which would
have prevented any "order, regulation or rule" of any exec-
33. Ibid.
34. Id. at § 14(D).
35. Id. at § 14(I).
36. Id. at § 14(I) (1).
37. Compare the enforcement procedure in the Workmen's Compensation
statute, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 72-63 (1952).
38. The bill, S. 50, 94th Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess. (1961), was referred
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utive or administrative agency ("other than the judicial de-
partment") from taking effect unless both houses of the
General Assembly had first approved it, and the "order, rule
or regulation" had been filed for thirty days thereafter.
Needless to say, such a bill, were it to become law, would
break down the administrative machinery of government.
(a) Its scope is such that every award of the Industrial
Commission, every order of the Public Service Commission,
and so on through the infinite variety of administrative
orders, would first have to secure legislative approval.39
(b) Even if "orders" were exempted, the effectiveness of
administrative action would still necessarily be postponed or
altogether blocked unless the legislature took the initiative
and acted upon the matter.
(c) Whatever the scope of application of the bill, there is
no indication of the status of administrative action during
that greater part of the year when the legislature is out of
session. Presumably, all rules, regulations and orders would
have to await the convening of the General Assembly to be
acted upon. And if it is thought that a standing committee
might exercise the power to approve or disapprove during
the months when the legislature is not sitting, it would be
necessary to ask whether such a function assigned to the
whole legislature could be delegated to a committee.
(d) The experience of a few states which have had such a
law, even in a much refined version, has revealed the un-
workability of such a procedure because of the delays in ad-
ministrative action.
4 0
39. The unlimited term "order" would seemingly include all interlocu-
tory agency orders and determinations.
40. Michigan has long had such a law, limited, however, to rules and
regulations promulgated by agencies. The effect here has been to deter
agencies from issuing rules and regulations, and instead to rely on orders,
thus doing their administrative tasks on a case-by-case basis like the
courts. This, of course, is undesirable, since administrative agencies are
are expected to regulate and plan for the future and they should be en-
couraged to do so by rule-making. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S.
194, 91 L.Ed. 1995 -(1947).
A similar proposal' (H. R. 6774) was introduced in the Congress to re-
quire prior congressional approval on all rules changes by federal agencies
prior to their becoming effective. Although this bill was limited only to
rules, and did not extend to orders in cases of adjudication, it was opposed
unanimously by the House of Delegation of the American Bar Association.
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